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Hierarchical PEs in Social Learning 
Abstract 
Social learning is fundamental to human interactions, yet its computational 
and physiological mechanisms are not well understood. One prominent open 
question concerns the role of neuromodulatory transmitters. We combined 
fMRI, computational modelling, and genetics to address this question in two 
separate samples (N=35, N=47). Participants played a game requiring inference 
on an advisor’s intentions whose motivation to help or mislead changed over 
time. Our analyses suggest that hierarchically structured belief updates about 
current advice validity and the adviser’s trustworthiness, respectively, depend 
on different neuromodulatory systems. Low-level prediction errors (PEs) about 
advice accuracy not only activated regions known to support “theory of mind”, 
but also the dopaminergic midbrain. Furthermore, PE responses in ventral 
striatum were influenced by the Met/Val polymorphism of the Catechol-O-
Methyltransferase (COMT) gene. By contrast, high-level PEs (“expected 
uncertainty”) about the adviser’s fidelity activated the cholinergic septum. 
These findings, replicated in both samples, have important implications: They 
suggest that social learning rests on hierarchically related PEs encoded by 
midbrain and septum activity, respectively, in the same manner as other forms 
of learning under volatility. Furthermore, these hierarchical PEs may be 
broadcast by dopaminergic and cholinergic projections to induce plasticity 
specifically in cortical areas known to represent beliefs about others.  
  
Hierarchical PEs in Social Learning 
Introduction 
As we navigate our complex social world, we interact with other agents whose 
motivations and intentions are not always easily discernible and may 
additionally fluctuate in time. Adapting our social behaviour flexibly requires 
“theory of mind” (ToM), an ability to represent and infer on others’ mental 
states (Baron-Cohen et al. 1985; Frith & Frith 2005). One influential idea 
concerning the implementation of ToM is that humans employ and 
continuously update models for simulating and predicting others’ behaviour 
(Behrens et al. 2009; Yoshida et al. 2008). While this idea has received 
empirical support (Behrens et al. 2008; Diaconescu et al. 2014; Nicolle et al. 
2012), our understanding of how such models may be instantiated 
algorithmically and physiologically is far from complete.  
In particular, major open questions concern the computational 
quantities involved in predicting others’ intentions and how they might be 
encoded by different neuromodulatory transmitter systems. Previous 
computational approaches to social learning have focused on prediction errors 
(PEs) in the context of reinforcement learning (Behrens et al., 2008; 
Christopoulos and King-Casas, 2015; Jones et al., 2011; Lohrenz et al., 2013; Xiang 
et al., 2013). These studies have shown that social PEs were not only 
represented in brain regions involved in reward learning – including the 
caudate (Biele et al., 2011; Klucharev et al., 2009) and orbitofrontal cortex 
(Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2010) – but also in regions associated with ToM 
processes, such as the superior temporal sulcus, temporal parietal junction 
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(TPJ),  and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (PFC) (Behrens et al., 2009). Notably, 
these regions were particularly active in response to negative social PEs 
signalling social norm violations and misleading behaviour (Behrens et al., 
2008). Social learning may thus partially draw on the same computational 
mechanisms as postulated for reward learning, i.e., PE-dependent value 
updates mediated by dopamine (DA). So far, however, there is limited 
experimental evidence beyond these computational neuroimaging studies that 
support a role of DA in social learning. 
Other studies in animals and humans have implicated the cholinergic 
system in social cognition (de Chaumont et al. 2012; di Cara et al. 2007), 
highlighting the role of the cholinergic basal forebrain (Ferreira et al. 2001, 
2003) and one of its subregions, the septum (Biele et al., 2011), for social 
learning. This raises the possibility that DA and acetylcholine (ACh) may play 
distinct roles in social learning, for example, by encoding different types of 
prediction errors. A similar scenario was recently found for sensory associative 
learning where hierarchically related and precision-weighted PEs have been 
linked to dopaminergic and cholinergic signals (Iglesias et al. 2013). Whether a 
similar dichotomy exists for social learning has yet to be examined.  
Here, we address this question using a Bayesian framework, the 
Hierarchical Gaussian Filter (HGF, Mathys et al., 2011, 2014), which was recently 
introduced to social learning paradigms (Diaconescu et al., 2014). This proposes 
that humans employ a hierarchical generative model to infer, from the 
observed behaviour of others, the mental states or beliefs, which cause these 
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actions. While structurally similar to the model introduced by (Behrens et al., 
2007), it is particularly suited for model-based fMRI analysis since it provides 
subject-specific estimates of PEs (and their precision-weighting) on each trial 
and each level of the model.  
In this study, we investigated hierarchical precision-weighted PEs during 
social inference and their potential link to neuromodulatory systems by a 
combination of computational modelling, genetics, and fMRI. We use a 
deception-free social learning task adapted from (Behrens et al., 2008) which 
requires inference on the changing intentions of an adviser (Diaconescu et al., 
2014). Notably, using two samples of volunteers from separate studies (N=35 
and N=47), we could verify the reproducibility of our results. In the following, 
we report those results which generalised across both studies. 
  
Hierarchical PEs in Social Learning 
Methods 
Participants 
Eighty-two healthy male adult volunteers between 19 and 30 years (mean age = 
25 ± 3.4; all right-handed) participated in two separate studies. Both studies had 
approval by the Ethics Committee of the Canton of Zurich (KEK-ZH-Nr. 2010-
0312/3 and KEK-ZH-Nr. 2012-0567). The second sample corresponded to the 
placebo group from a pharmacological study whose complete results will be 
reported elsewhere. Written informed consent was obtained from all 
participants.  
Only men participated in the study to avoid potential influences of the 
menstrual cycle on neuromodulatory processes and synaptic plasticity (Dreher 
et al., 2007; Fernandez et al., 2003). All volunteers had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision. Volunteers with a previous history of neurological or psychiatric 
diseases or drug abuse were excluded from participation. Furthermore, 
participants were excluded if they were taking medication or had consumed 
alcohol within 24 hours of participation in the study.  
Selection of single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) 
Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) was collected from saliva samples using Isohelix 
swabs. SNP analyses were performed using the Fluidigm BioMark System 
(AROS, Aarhus, Denmark) and independently replicated using allelic 
discrimination assays (TaqMan SNP Genotyping Assays, Life Technologies). 
The genotyping PCR was carried out on a 7900HT Fast Real-Time PCR System 
(Applied Biosystems) and the resulting fluorescence data was analyzed with 
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Sequence Detection Software (SDS) 2.3 (Applied Biosystems). The SNP 
selection was guided by the a priori hypothesis that social learning is 
modulated by tonic DA levels which may encode the precision of beliefs or 
predictions and serve to weight trial-wise prediction errors (Friston et al. 2012; 
Iglesias et al. 2013). We focused on two genes which play central roles for the 
synthesis and metabolism of DA, respectively: tyrosine hydroxylase (rs3842727), 
the rate-limiting enzyme for DA synthesis, and Catechol-O-Methyltransferase 
or COMT (rs4680), a key enzyme for DA metabolism in prefrontal cortex, but 
also the ventral striatum (Frank et al., 2007; Matsumoto et al., 2003; Meyer-
Lindenberg et al., 2005; Mier et al., 2010). The SNPs obtained were used in the 
random effects group analysis as covariates of interest. 
Procedure 
Stimuli 
In a previous study (Diaconescu et al., 2014), we introduced an interactive 
economic game in which a pair of volunteers (randomly assigned to “player” 
and “adviser” roles) performed a probabilistic reinforcement learning task with 
monetary incentives (Figure 1). Players were informed about the odds of 
winning by a visual pie chart that indicated the winning probability of two 
available choice options. Advisers received additional information about the 
outcome, with a constant accuracy of 80%.  
The players’ goal was simple: they had to maximize their final pay-out by 
making correct predictions on as many trials as possible. By contrast, the 
advisers’ incentive structure to help or mislead the player was designed to 
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include periods of both cooperation and competition. Specifically, the payment 
of the advisers depended on whether the players’ cumulative score would, at 
the end of the game, lie within predefined “silver” or “gold” ranges (see 
Supplementary Figure 1a and b). Depending on the player’s current 
performance, advisers would therefore variably offer helpful or misleading 
suggestions about the most likely outcome. The players did not know these 
details but were generally informed that the advisers had a distinct incentive 
structure, and to achieve their goals, their intention to provide helpful 
suggestions might change over the course of the task. Further details about this 
paradigm can be found in Diaconescu et al. (2014). 
We received informed consent from all volunteers in this initial study to 
record and use the advice-giving videos in subsequent fMRI studies. Based on 
the predominant strategy employed by the advisers (Diaconescu et al., 2014), 
three of the recorded full-length videos were edited into 2-sec video clips of 
advice giving. All the videos were selected from trials in which the advisers 
truly intended to provide helpful or misleading advice, which was determined 
by debriefing after the experiment. All video clips were matched in terms of 
their luminance, contrast, and colour balance using the video software Adobe 
Photoshop Premiere CS6. 
In this study, one of the three chosen advisers was randomly assigned to 
each participant. No differences in performance and degree of reliance on the 
advice were observed between the three adviser types.  
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Experimental Design 
To predict the outcome of the lottery, participants could rely on the visual pie 
chart, the social advice, or integrate these social and non-social sources of 
information. While the predictive strength of the non-social cue was provided 
explicitly on every trial, participants were required to learn about volatility, i.e., 
the changing nature of the adviser’s intentions, in order to judge whether and 
how to exploit the advice.  
In total, the task consisted of 189 trials, which contained 6 visual cue 
types (75:25, 65:35, 55:45, 45:55, 35:65, and 25:75 % blue: % green pie charts). 
Participants indicated their predictions during a 6s decision phase, which 
immediately followed the presentation of advice and visual cue. Participants 
received visual feedback after the decision phase. For every correct prediction, 
the participant’s score increased by one point; for every missed trial or 
incorrect prediction, the score decreased by one point. The participant’s final 
payment was proportional to his total score, plus a potential bonus (additive), if 
the cumulative score reached his silver or gold targets (see Figure 1). The 
assignment of the blue or green colours to the button presses (left or right) was 
counterbalanced across participants.  
The task was programmed and presented using Cogent 2000 (Wellcome 
Laboratory of Neurology, University College London, UK) under Matlab 
(Mathworks). At the end of the study, all participants were debriefed about the 
task and were asked about the strategy they had employed during the game.  
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This task was employed in two separate fMRI studies with different 
groups of volunteers (N=35 and N=47, respectively). The second sample 
corresponded to a group of participants from a pharmacological study who 
received placebo. Otherwise, the experimental procedure differed only in terms 
of the stimulus input structure (see Supplementary Figure 1c for details). In the 
second fMRI study, we optimized the trial sequence by simulations seeking to 
maximize parameter identifiability.  
Data Acquisition 
In the first fMRI study, images were acquired using a Philips Achieva 3T whole-
body scanner with an 8-channel SENSE head coil (Philips Medical Systems, 
Best, The Netherlands) at the Laboratory for Social and Neural Systems 
Research, Dept. of Economics, University of Zurich.  
We acquired gradient echo T2*-weighted echo-planar images (EPIs) 
with blood-oxygen-level dependent (BOLD) contrast (slices/volume = 37; 
repetition time = 2.5 s; voxel size = 2 x 2 x 3 mm3; interslice gap = 0.6 mm; field 
of view (FOV) = 192 x 192 x 180 mm; echo time (TE) = 36 ms; flip angle = 90°). 
Oblique-transverse slices with +15° right-left angulation were acquired. The 
experimental task was run in two sessions with 740 and 580 volumes in the first 
and the second session, respectively, together with five discarded volumes at 
the start of each scanning session to ensure T1 effects were at equilibrium. A 
high-resolution inversion-recovery T1-weighted 3D-TFE (turbo field echo) 
structural image was also acquired for each participant (301 slices; voxel size = 
1.1 x 1.1 x 0.6 mm3; FOV = 250 mm; TE = 3.4 ms). 
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In the second fMRI study, images were recorded using a Philips Ingenia 
3T whole-body scanner with a 32-channel SENSE head coil (Philips Medical 
Systems, Best, The Netherlands) at the Institute for Biomedical Engineering, 
University of Zurich and ETH Zurich. The sequence and acquisition parameters 
were identical to the previous study. 
In both studies, stimuli were projected onto a display, which participants 
viewed through a mirror fitted on top of the head coil (NordicNeuroLab LCD 
MR-compatible 32-inch monitor). Participants’ heart rate and respiration was 
recorded during scanning with a 4-electrode electrocardiogram (ECG) and a 
breathing belt. 
Data Pre-processing and Analysis 
FMRI data were preprocessed and analyzed using the SPM12 software package 
version 6225 (Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, London, UK; 
http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm).  
The functional images were realigned, unwarped and co-registered to 
the participant’s own structural scan. The structural image was processed using 
a unified segmentation procedure combining segmentation, bias correction, 
and spatial normalization (Ashburner and Friston, 2005); the same 
normalization parameters were then used to normalize the EPI images. Finally, 
EPI images were smoothed with a Gaussian kernel of 6mm full-width half-
maximum. 
Correction for physiological noise was performed with the PhysIO 
toolbox (Kasper et al., 2016) using Fourier expansions of different order for the 
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estimated phases of cardiac pulsation (3rd order), respiration (4th order) and 
cardio-respiratory interactions (1st order). This toolbox is part of the open 
source software package TAPAS 
(http://www.translationalneuromodeling.org/tapas).  
Computational Modelling Framework 
In our previous behavioural study using the interactive version of the social 
learning task with real human advisers (Diaconescu et al., 2014), we conducted 
a systematic comparison of alternative models, which might explain the 
observed behaviour. Here, we repeat this analysis for the adapted version of the 
paradigm with videotaped advice, as described above.  
The computational framework adopted in this study is guided by 
Bayesian theories of brain function which suggest that the brain maintains and 
continuously updates a model of the environment and uses this model to infer 
the causes of its sensory inputs (Bastos et al., 2012; Dayan et al., 1995; Friston, 
2005, 2010; Rao and Ballard, 1999). A basic feature of our modelling approach is 
the division into perceptual and response models (for details, see Daunizeau et 
al. 2010). In other words, participants are thought to update their beliefs about 
states of the external world based on the sensory inputs they receive 
(perceptual model) and use these beliefs to make decisions (response model).  
Our model space was structured hierarchically as is shown in Figure 2. 
With regard to the perceptual model, we operated under the general 
assumption that participants employ a generative model of their sensory inputs 
(Daunizeau et al. 2010; Mathys et al. 2011) in order to infer on the advice validity 
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and the intentions of the adviser. Different hypotheses about the exact way in 
which participants learned from advice and integrated social and non-social 
sources of information were formalised in a series of models, as described in 
the next section. The main question was whether the participants’ model of the 
adviser’s intentions had hierarchical structure and was capable of taking into 
account potential changes in the adviser's strategy into its predictions about 
advice reliability. We thus compared a hierarchical Bayesian model, the HGF 
(Mathys et al., 2011, 2014) (M, … ,M) to a non-hierarchical Rescorla-Wagner 
(RW) reinforcement learning model (Rescorla and Wagner, 1972) (M, … ,M) 
and a non-hierarchical version of the HGF (M, … ,M	) (Diaconescu et al., 2014). 
With regard to the response models, we examined whether participants 
based their decisions on (1) the integration of advice and cue probabilities (the 
“Integrated” model family for models M, M
, M, M), (2) the advice accuracy 
only (“Reduced: advice” model family for models M, M, M,M) or (3) the 
visually-cued probability only (“Reduced: cue” model family for models 
M, M, M	, M). As in our previous study (Diaconescu et al., 2014), we also 
considered two different mechanisms of how beliefs were transformed into 
responses. First, participants’ decisions might be perturbed by (fixed) decision 
noise (“Decision noise” model family for models M
, . . , M). Alternatively, 
participants’ decision noise might vary trial-by-trial with the estimated 
volatility of the adviser’s intentions (“Volatility” model family for models 
M, M, M). In other words, the more volatile an adviser is perceived, the less a 
participant might rely on his current belief about advice validity for making a 
decision and hence the less deterministic his belief-to-response mapping. 
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Perceptual Model: Hierarchical Gaussian Filter (HGF) 
The HGF is a hierarchical model of perception and learning, which allows for 
inference on an agent’s belief and uncertainty about the state of the world from 
observed behaviour (see Mathys et al., 2011 for theoretical background and 
Diaconescu et al., 2014 for a recent application to social learning). Its generic 
nature has enabled a series of recent behavioural and neuroimaging studies on 
different forms of learning and decision-making (Diaconescu et al. 2014; Hauser 
et al. 2014; Iglesias et al. 2013; Schwartenbeck et al. 2014; Vossel et a. 2014a,b; 
Vossel et a. 2015). According to this model, an agent continuously revises a 
generative (predictive) model of its sensory inputs, which allows for inference 
on hidden environmental states 
(), 
(), … , ()	  that are hierarchically 
organized and cause the sensory inputs the agent experiences on each trial k.  
In the HGF, these states evolve in time as Gaussian random walks where, at any 
given level, the step size is controlled by the state of the next-higher level 
(Mathys et al., 2011, 2014).  
In the specific case of our social learning paradigm,  represents a 
categorical variable or the advice accuracy. Any single piece of advice is either 
accurate (
() = 1)  or inaccurate (
() = 0) .  All states higher than   are 
continuous. State  represents the adviser’s fidelity in logit space. The highest 
state   represents the rate at which the advisers’ intentions change; this 
determines the log-volatility of adviser fidelity (log variance of the step size of 
). The exact equations describing these relations and the overall generative 
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model are summarised by Figure 3; a detailed description can be found in 
Diaconescu et al. (2014).  
Three subject-specific parameters determine how the above states evolve 
in time as a function of the inputs (including the visual pie chart, advice, trial 
outcome) and influence each other. Firstly,  determines the coupling between 
the second and third level in the hierarchy, capturing the degree to which a 
subject utilises his estimate of the adviser’s changing intentions to infer on his 
current fidelity. Secondly,  represents a constant (tonic) component of the 
log-volatility of . It captures the subject-specific magnitude of the belief 
update about the adviser’s fidelity that is independent of . Thirdly,  (meta-
volatility) determines the evolution of  or how rapidly the volatility of the 
adviser’s intentions changes in time.  
A key idea of the HGF framework is that agents “invert” the generative 
model in Figure 3 (i.e., they update their beliefs about the hierarchically 
coupled states in the external word) by employing an efficient variational 
approximation to ideal Bayesian inference (see Mathys et al. 2011 for details). 
The update rules that emerge from this approximation have a simple and 
interpretable form with structural similarity to classical reinforcement learning 
models but with a an adaptive learning rate determined by the next higher level 
in the hierarchy. Specifically, at each hierarchical level i, updates of beliefs 
(posterior means 
()
) on each trial k are proportional to precision-weighted 
PEs, 
()
 (Equation 1). In essence, the belief adjustment is the product of the PE 
from the level below 
()
, weighted by a precision ratio  
()
:  
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
() ∝ ̂
() +  
()	
() 													 
where 
(1) 
 
 
() = $%
()
$
() 	. 
 
(2) 
 
Here, $%
()  and $
()represent estimates of the precision of the prediction about 
input from the level below (i.e., precision of the data) and of the belief at the 
current level, respectively. What follows from this expression is that PEs are 
given a larger weight (and thus updates are more pronounced) when the 
precision of the data (input from the lower level) is high relative to the 
precision of the prior belief. 
The low-level (advice validity) PE or , which updates estimates about 
the adviser fidelity or 
()
, represents a magnitude error:  
() = &()() 
with 
(3) 
 
1
(') ≝ )(') − μ%1(k)	 (4) 
&() =
1
$
() ,			$
() = 	$%
() + 1
$%
() 
(5) 
By contrast, the high-level PE, which serves to update estimates about 
the volatility of the adviser’s intentions or 
()
, represents a probability PE (in 
logit space).  

() = &
() 
2.
()
()
 
with 
(6) 
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
() ≝
&() + /() − ()0

&
() + exp	(
() + )
− 1		 
(7) 
 
&() =

45
(6), $
() = $%
() + 	 7
8
 .
() /.() + 9()()0 (8) 
 
with the weighting factors defined as: 
 
.
() ≝ exp	(
() +)
&
() + exp	(
() +)
 
 
 
 
 
(9) 
9
() ≝ 2.
() − 1. (10) 
 
Equation 7 shows , the unweighted high-level PE. The denominator of this 
ratio contains the predicted uncertainty about adviser fidelity based on the 
previous trial, whereas the numerator contains the observed uncertainty. Thus, 
whenever the observed uncertainty exceeds the predicted, the fraction is 
greater than one and the high-level PE becomes positive. Conversely, when the 
observed uncertainty is less than the predicted, the PE is negative.  
In other words,  represents a PE about the certainty of the estimate of 
adviser fidelity. This renders it conceptually similar (but not identical) to 
“expected uncertainty” (Yu and Dayan, 2005) which had been operationalised 
as the difference between an estimate of cue validity and certainty (compare 
the Supplementary Material in Iglesias et al. 2013). 
Response Models 
The response model embodies a (probabilistic) mapping from the agent’s 
beliefs to decisions (Daunizeau et al., 2010). As participants had access to both 
social and non-social information, our first response model assumed that 
participants integrated the social and non-social sources of information in 
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order to predict the accuracy of the advice. Specifically, using ζ	 ∈ <0,1= as the 
weight the player assigns to the social information, the integrated belief >() 
that the advice on trial k is accurate is:  
>() = ?	̂
() + (1 − ?)@̃(), 
 
(11) 
 
Here, ζ serves to balance ̂
()
, the participant’s current belief that the adviser 
will give valid advice, against cC(D), the probability (as signaled by the visual pie 
chart) of the recommended advice being correct. For example, let us consider 
the scenario when the adviser recommends the participant to pick “blue”. 
According to our formalism, if the inferred probability of advice accuracy is 
80% (̂
()
 = 0.80) and the pie chart indicates that blue is 25% likely (@̃()= 0.25), 
a participant who weights the two sources of information equally (? = 0.5) 
would predict that the probability that the outcome is blue is 55%. Two 
additional response models were created by reducing this model, either 
assuming that participants only relied on the advice during decision-making 
(i.e., setting ? = 1) or that they only took into account the cued probability 
(i.e., ? = 0). 
The probability that the participant follows his integrated belief, and 
thus the advice (to a degree specified by ?), was described by a sigmoid 
function; here, responses are coded as E = 1 when going with the advice, as 
opposed to E = 0 when going against it): 
FGE() = 1H>()I = >
()J
>()J + (1 − >())J
 
(12) 
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where β represents the inverse of the decision temperature: as β → ∞, the 
sigmoid function approaches a step function with a unit step at b(D) = 0.5 (i.e., 
no decision noise). As described above, we considered two alternatives how this 
belief-to-response mapping might be structured: One option is the presence of 
constant decision noise; here, β becomes a subject-specific free parameter. 
Alternatively, the decision temperature parameter P  might vary with the 
estimate of adviser volatility, exp	(−
()). In other words, this assumed that the 
more volatile an adviser was perceived, the less deterministic the player’s 
belief-to-response mapping.  
Using the same set of priors for the model parameters as in our previous 
study (Supplementary Table 1), maximum-a-posteriori (MAP) estimates of 
model parameters were obtained using the HGF toolbox version 3.0. This 
MATLAB-based toolbox is freely available as part of the open source software 
package TAPAS at http://www.translationalneuromodeling.org/tapas. 
Bayesian Model Selection and Family Inference 
Using Bayesian model selection (BMS), we inferred on the model subjects most 
likely used to predict the outcome. For a single subject, this involves computing 
a free-energy approximation to the model evidence F(E|R), the probability of 
the data y given a model m (Daunizeau et al., 2010a; Friston et al., 2007). We 
used random effects inference to compare candidate models at the group level. 
This relies on a hierarchical scheme, which accounts for the possibility that the 
behaviour of different participants is governed by different models (Rigoux et 
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al., 2014; Stephan et al., 2009). This results in a posterior probability for each 
model, given the group data; alternatively, the relative goodness of models can 
be expressed in terms of so-called “exceedance probabilities”. The exceedance 
probability of a model is the probability that this model has a higher posterior 
probability than any other model (in the set of models considered) (Stephan et 
al 2009). One can also derive a “protected” exceedance probability, which 
protects against the possibility that any difference between models might have 
arisen by chance (Rigoux et al. 2014). 
Given the structure of our model space, we also used family-level 
inference (Penny et al., 2010) to determine (i) the most likely type of perceptual 
model, pooling across all response models, and (2) the most likely response 
model type, pooling across all perceptual models (see Diaconescu et al., 2014 for 
more details of this application in the context of social learning).  
Model-Based fMRI Analysis 
The fMRI data were modelled voxel-wise, including the subject-specific 
trajectories of computational quantities from the winning model in a general 
linear model (GLM). Computational variables of interest were used as 
parametric modulators of regressors encoding trial components, as described 
below. We did not orthogonalise the parametric modulators. 
At the lowest level in hierarchy, we examined the precision-weighted PE 
about advice validity (
()
 in Eq. 3), which serves to update estimates of the 
adviser’s fidelity. We focused on the signed advice PE because, following the 
analysis approach by (Behrens et al., 2008), because we wanted to contrast 
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trials, in which the adviser was more helpful than predicted (positive PEs) to 
those in which he was more misleading (negative PEs). While the former 
constitutes positive social feedback (as in Biele et al., 2011), the latter signals a 
potential shift in the adviser’s strategy or intentions and a possible need for 
behavioural adaptation by the subject. 
At the highest level in the hierarchy, we examined the precision-
weighted PE about adviser fidelity (i.e., advice-outcome contingency in logit 
space), 
()
 in Eq. 6. This PE represents a teaching signal for updating the 
estimate about the (log) volatility of the adviser’s intentions; again, we used the 
signed PE as a regressor. The corresponding parametric modulators in the GLM 
were modelled as events that were time-locked to the display of trial outcome.  
To also address the question whether individuals who weighted the 
social advice more exhibited a stronger activation of theory of mind regions in 
trials when they followed the advice compared to trials, in which they decided 
against the advice, we expanded the regression model at the single-subject 
level. Thus, we also modelled the decision phase (time-locked to the 
presentation of the advice) using the inferred adviser fidelity or ̂
()
 (Eq. 1) as a 
parametric modulator. 
To summarize, the following regressors (plus their temporal and 
dispersion derivatives) were included in the model:  
1. Cue & Advice: phases when both the binary lottery and the social 
advice were presented onscreen; 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2. Cue & Advice x Adviser Fidelity: advice presentation phase, 
modulated by the predicted adviser fidelity on each trial;  
3. Outcome: phases when the outcome of the trial was presented 
onscreen;  
4. Outcome x Low-level PE: monitor phase, modulated by the precision-
weighted advice PE on each trial;  
5. Outcome x High-level PE: monitor phase, modulated by the 
precision-weighted volatility PE on each trial. 
Finally, 18 physiological noise regressors computed using the PhysIO 
toolbox (Kasper et al., 2016) and 6 motion parameter vectors from the 
realignment procedure were included as regressors of no interest to account for 
BOLD signal variance induced by physiological noise (cardiac pulsation and 
respiration) and head motion, respectively.  
Random effects group analysis across all 82 participants was performed 
using the standard summary statistics approach in GLM analyses of fMRI data 
(Penny and Holmes, 2007). We used one-sample t tests to separately examine 
positive and negative BOLD responses for the learning trajectories of interest. 
To examine individual differences in the representation of hierarchical PEs as a 
function of tonic DA levels, we used the tyrosine hydroxylase and COMT 
polymorphism labels as covariate variables of interest.  
For all analyses, we report any BOLD responses that survived whole-
brain family-wise error (FWE) correction, either at the peak-level (p < 0.05) or 
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at the cluster level, based on Gaussian random field (GRF) theory (p < 0.05) 
with p < 0.001 voxel-level cut-off (Friston, 2007). The coordinates of all brain 
regions were expressed in Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) space; 
anatomical designations for local maxima were obtained by visual inspection 
and additionally verified using the MNI AAL atlas (Maldjian et al., 2003).  
In addition to whole-brain analyses, we performed region-of-interest 
(ROI) analyses based on an anatomical mask of the dopaminergic midbrain, 
which included the substantia nigra (SN) and the ventral tegmental area (VTA). 
The mask was created using an anatomical atlas based on magnetization 
transfer weighted structural MR images (see Bunzeck and Düzel, 2006) (see 
Supplementary Figure 5a). Additionally, given that septal activity had 
previously been implicated in high-level precision-weighted PEs (Iglesias et al. 
2013) and social learning (Biele et al. 2011), we created a mask comprising both 
the medial and lateral regions of the septum. The basal forebrain mask was 
created using the anatomical toolbox in SPM12 
(http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm) and defined using the maximum probability 
map from a probabilistic cytoarchitectonic atlas warped into MNI space (see 
Eickhoff et al., 2005; Zaborszky et al., 2008). This map included the different 
compartments of the basal forebrain with cholinergic neurons (septum, the 
diagonal band of Broca, and subpallidal regions including the basal nucleus of 
Meynert; see Supplementary Figure 5b). FWE correction for multiple 
comparisons was performed for the entire ROI resulting from combining both 
anatomical masks from midbrain and septum. 
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Results 
In the two studies, two separate groups of healthy volunteers (N=82 in total) 
inferred on the trustworthiness of an adviser in order to accumulate points in a 
probabilistic task with monetary incentives. Because the adviser’s intentions 
varied as a function of his (hidden) strategy, optimal performance required 
learning about the advice validity as well as the adviser’s changing intentions. 
Performance accuracy averaged at 68% ± 4% (mean ± standard 
deviation) in study 1 and 67% ± 2% in study 2, indicating that participants 
reached the silver target and received on average a CHF 10 bonus at the end of 
the studies. Furthermore, we found that the risk associated with the binary 
lottery influenced participants’ decisions: Participants relied significantly more 
on the advice for the 55:45 cue options compared to the 75:25 option 
(t(34)=22.38, p<0.05 in study 1, t(46)=10.62, p<0.05 in study 2). Notably, the 
impact of the cue probabilities on decisions was lower in study 2 compared to 
study 1, because participants relied more on the social advice in the second 
study.  Since individual choices not only depended on cue probabilities, but 
also on inferred adviser’s fidelity, we performed further model-based analysis of 
choice behaviour. 
Model Comparison and Posterior Parameter Estimates 
Our first step of analysis comprised model comparison, using random effects 
Bayesian model selection (BMS) to evaluate the balance between fit and 
complexity of all models shown in Figure 2. When considering all models 
individually and separately for each study, the three-level HGF with the 
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“Integrated” response model (M) outperformed the rest of the models in each 
participant (Table 1a and 2a). When adopting a family-level perspective, the 
three-level HGF family (M, … , M	) outperformed non-hierarchical models 
(M
, … ,M	), such as the reduced HGF (no volatility) and the RW models (Table 
1b and 2b). Concerning the response models, the family of response models 
assuming that participants integrate both social and non-social sources of 
information (i.e., M, M
, M,M) best explained participants’ choices (Table 1c 
and 2c). Notably, all of these model selection results replicated the findings 
from our previous study (Diaconescu et al. 2014), which used a different group 
of subjects and a fully interactive paradigm with real human advisers. 
Furthermore, all BMS results were reproduced across both fMRI studies (see 
Tables 1 and 2). 
Additionally, we used multiple regression to evaluate how well our 
model explained participants’ performance (percentage of correct responses). 
As in our previous study (Diaconescu et al., 2014), we found that the MAP 
estimates extracted from the winning model (M), i.e., κ	, , , and ?, jointly 
predicted participants’ performance accuracy across both fMRI studies 
(R2=28.36%, F = 4.09, p < 0.018 in fMRI study 1 and R2=39%, F = 2.53, p < 0.02 in 
fMRI study 2; see Tables 1d and 2d for average MAP estimates). Post-hoc tests 
suggested that the explanatory power could be chiefly attributed to the social 
weighting parameter ζ, a result which held across both studies: (R2=17.67%, F = 
7.08, p < 0.01 in fMRI study 1 and R2=15%, F = 7.72, p < 0.01 in fMRI study 2). 
The positive slope of the associated regression coefficient indicated that 
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participants who weighted the advice more than the non-social cue during 
decision-making performed better on the task.  
FMRI Analysis of Hierarchical PEs 
Our fMRI analysis focused on the neural representation of precision-weighted 
PEs across the hierarchical levels of the HGF. For each computational quantity 
of interest, our model-based fMRI analysis proceeded in four steps: first, we 
performed whole-brain analyses separately in two independent samples of 
N=35 and N=47 volunteers; second, we focused on our anatomically defined 
regions of interest (ROIs) using a combined mask of dopaminergic and 
cholinergic nuclei (midbrain and basal forebrain; see Methods); third, we 
examined how PE representations varied as a function of COMT 
polymorphisms. Following the procedure of a recent study (Iglesias et al. 2013), 
we adopted a very conservative approach to assess the reproducibility of the PE 
effects across the two fMRI studies. That is, we used a voxel-wise “logical AND” 
conjunction (Nichols et al. 2005) on the FWE-thresholded activation maps 
from both fMRI studies. In the following, we focus on those activations for 
which this procedure showed an overlap of significant activations in both fMRI 
studies.  
Low-level precision-weighted prediction errors 
By fitting computational trajectories to participants’ fMRI data, we found that 
across both fMRI studies ε (the signed precision-weighted PE about advice 
validity) was represented in the left caudate, right anterior cingulate cortex 
(ACC), left middle cingulate cortex, the bilateral anterior insula, and the right 
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dorsomedial and dorsolateral PFC (whole-brain, peak-level FWE corrected 
p<0.05; Figure 4; Table 3). Activity in these regions scaled with the magnitude 
of negative PEs; that is, these regions were more active on trials when the other 
agent was more misleading than predicted, signalling increased perspective-
taking demands and the need to update one’s model of the other agent.  
One particularly notable finding in this context was a significant 
activation of the midbrain (ventral tegmental area, VTA / substantia nigra, SN) 
by PEs signalling misleading advice (negative ε). In the second study, this 
activation was even more pronounced and also survived whole-brain cluster-
level correction (p<0.05; Figure 5; Table 3). 
In the second study, we also observed activations by negative advice PEs 
in the bilateral temporal-parietal junction (TPJ) and right middle and superior 
temporal cortices (peak-level corrected, p < 0.05; Figure 4; Table 3).  
In both studies, the left precuneus signaled positive PEs in response to 
trials when the adviser was more helpful than predicted. In the first study, 
however, both the left anterior TPJ and the fusiform gyrus showed positive PE 
effects (whole-brain, cluster-level FWE corrected p<0.05; Supplementary Figure 
2; Supplementary Table 2). 
High-level precision-weighted prediction errors 
At the highest level in the hierarchy, we found that ε or the signed precision-
weighted PE about the adviser’s strategy (which drives updates to beliefs about 
the volatility of the adviser’s intentions) correlated positively with activity in 
the right dorsal middle cingulate cortex peaking at [7, -12, 42] in the first study 
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(Figure 6A). Furthermore, in the second study, the effect of high-level PE was 
localized to the right dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) with a group-level 
peak at [6, 30, 28] (whole-brain cluster-level FWE corrected p<0.05; Figure 6B; 
Table 4). 
Additionally, in both studies, the right middle cingulate sulcus, parietal 
regions, such as the right paracentral lobule correlated negatively with this 
high-level PE (whole-brain, cluster-level FWE corrected p<0.05; Supplementary 
Figure 3). Finally, and perhaps most remarkably, both studies showed a positive 
correlation of the high-level precision-weighted PE with activity in the left 
septum (p<0.05 FWE corrected for the entire mask volume, Figure 7), a 
subregion of the cholinergic basal forebrain.   
Genetic factors for individual variability in social learning  
To elucidate the influence of DA on learning from advice, we examined how 
hierarchical PE representations varied as a function of SNPs of genes encoding 
TH and COMT, which play key roles for DA synthesis and metabolism, 
respectively. We did not observe any variation in low- and high-level PE 
representations as a function of TH polymorphisms, nor did polymorphisms of 
COMT seem to affect high-level PEs in our paradigm.  
By contrast, we found an enhanced representation of ε  (precision-
weighted PE about advice validity) as a function of Val-to-Met COMT 
polymorphisms in the left ventral striatum in fMRI study 1 (Figure 8A) and in 
the left dorsal striatum in fMRI study 2 (Figure 8C). Specifically, Met/Met 
carriers, who have reduced efficacy of COMT and enhanced tonic DA levels, 
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showed larger effects of ε in the striatum compared to Val/Val or Val/Met 
carriers. This effect was detected in the first fMRI study (whole-brain, peak-
level FWE corrected p<0.05; Figure 8B), and reproduced in the second fMRI 
study, albeit less robustly (whole-brain, cluster-level FWE corrected p<0.05; 
Figure 8D). While COMT is usually considered in the context of prefrontal 
cortex function, it is worth pointing out that it is also involved in DA 
metabolism in the striatum (Matsumoto et al., 2003; Chen et al. 2004); see 
Discussion.  
Finally, in the first study, effects of COMT variability in low-level PE 
representation were also found in the left dorsolateral PFC (see Supplementary 
Figure 4), although this result was not replicated in the second fMRI study. 
These differences may be due to the fact that there was a less balanced 
distribution for the COMT polymorphisms in the second fMRI study compared 
to the first. The distributions of the COMT polymorphisms were the following: 
fMRI study 1 with 8 Val/Val, 17 Val/Met and 10 Met/Met allele carriers and fMRI 
study 2 with 10 Val/Val, 27 Val/Met and 9 Met/Met allele carriers. 
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Discussion 
Predicting the intentions of others is central to human interactions. However, 
the computational principles and neural mechanisms underlying this more 
sophisticated form of learning are not well understood. In this study, we 
combined hierarchical Bayesian models with an ecologically valid, deception-
free paradigm, fMRI, and genetics to address the question of the role of 
neuromodulatory systems in social learning. We found that hierarchically 
structured belief updates about the adviser’s fidelity and changing intentions 
best explained participants’ decisions to consider the advice. Furthermore, 
hierarchically coupled PEs mapped onto distinct neuromodulatory systems as 
previously shown for sensory learning under volatility (see Iglesias et al., 2013). 
Specifically, low-level PEs that updated predictions about the adviser’s fidelity 
activated the dopaminergic midbrain. The link of DA to low-level PEs in social 
learning was further supported by the finding of variability in PE magnitude in 
the striatum as a function of COMT, a single nucleotide polymorphism that 
modulates tonic DA levels by altering the metabolism of DA. The genotype 
favouring higher concentrations of DA lead to enhanced activity for signed 
advice PEs in the striatum, a regions with high COMT mRNA expression (Chen 
et al., 2004; Matsumoto et al., 2003). 
On the other hand, high-level PEs used to update predictions about the 
(log) volatility of the adviser’s intentions were represented in the cholinergic 
basal forebrain. This result provides additional support for the proposal that 
ACh signals expected uncertainty (Yu and Dayan, 2005), which is related to the 
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high-level PE in the sense that the latter also represents a difference between 
belief certainty (given the adviser’s estimated intentions) and a conditional 
probability, the adviser’s fidelity (see also the discussion in Iglesias et al 2013).  
During the decision phase of the task, we found that on trials when the 
subject followed the advice, the bilateral fusiform gyrus and middle cingulate 
gyrus increasingly activated, the higher the currently predicted advisor fidelity 
̂ (Figure 9; regions in red). Conversely, when deciding to go against the 
advice, predicted adviser fidelity activated regions associated with “theory of 
mind” processes, such as the  left anterior insula, right temporal parietal 
junction (TPJ), bilateral paracingulate cortex, and bilateral dorsomedial PFC, as 
well as the right caudate (Figure 9; regions in blue). Remarkably, in spite of the 
different input structure, these effects were also consistent across the two fMRI 
studies (see Figure 9C). 
General and domain-specific roles of prediction errors 
To our knowledge, our results provide the first demonstration that distinct 
social PEs (with regard to current advice validity and the adviser’s general 
trustworthiness, respectively) activate different neuromodulatory nuclei, i.e., 
the dopaminergic midbrain and the cholinergic basal forebrain. When 
comparing our present findings to recent work based on the same 
computational framework but studying associative learning about purely 
sensory events under volatility (Iglesias et al 2013), some remarkable similarities 
arise: Despite profound differences in the target of learning (simple auditory 
and visual stimuli in Iglesias et al. 2013, and abstract concepts such as advice 
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validity and adviser trustworthiness in the current study), both studies found 
that key computational quantities – i.e., low- and high-level precision-weighted 
PEs – were encoded by activity in the dopaminergic midbrain and the 
cholinergic basal forebrain, respectively.  
In contrast to this striking similarity how PEs were encoded by activity 
in subcortical neuromodulatory nuclei, PE-induced cortical activations differed 
considerably and may reflect context-specific aspects of the respective learning 
process. For example, while the activations by low-level PEs (about visual 
stimulus outcome) reported by Iglesias et al. (2013) included visual and parietal 
regions, the present study found activation by low-level PEs (about advice 
validity) in regions commonly assumed to support “theory of mind” processes. 
For example, the low-level precision-weighted PE signals in the current study 
were found in the paracingulate cortex, a region associated with mentalizing 
during interactive games (Gallagher et al., 2002; Kircher et al., 2009; Rilling and 
Sanfey, 2011). In terms of the posterior parietal activations, the present study 
found low-level precision-weighted PEs in the TPJ, whereas in Iglesias et al. 
(2013) the effect of outcome PE was localized to the inferior parietal lobule. 
Furthermore, the peak of the anterior insula activation was also slightly more 
anterior than in Iglesias et al. and found in an insular region previously 
reported as linked to theory of mind processes (Lamm and Singer, 2010; Schurz 
et al., 2014). These observations corroborate and extend previous 
considerations by Behrens et al (2008) on the role of DA for social and reward 
learning, respectively.  
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Taken together, the results from Iglesias et al. (2013) and the current 
study suggest that hierarchical precision-weighted PEs represent generic 
computational quantities that may be used across a range of different learning 
processes and may be encoded by the same neuromodulatory transmitters, but 
are used in a context-specific fashion to trigger synaptic plasticity in distinct 
circuits involved in different forms of learning. 
PE activations of areas implicated in social learning and inference 
In the present study, the activations by the two hierarchically related PEs from 
our computational model were found in cortical areas whose relevance for 
social learning and inference has been highlighted by numerous previous 
studies. Low-level precision-weighted PEs about advice validity were found to 
be encoded by activity in several dopaminoceptive cortical regions, such as the 
TPJ, the dorsomedial and dorsolateral PFC, ACC, SMA, and insula. For example, 
the TPJ has been associated with mentalizing functions, such as thinking about 
others’ beliefs or desires (Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003; Saxe and Wexler, 2005; 
Young and Saxe, 2009), while activation of the dorsomedial PFC has been 
reported when participants simulated others’ intentions (Behrens et al., 2008; 
Frith and Frith, 2006, 2012) and decisions (Nicolle et al., 2012). Consistent with 
the PE activation we found, responses in these regions were previously reported 
to be reduced when new information about the other person was better 
predicted (Garvert et al., 2015; Ma et al., 2012; Mende-Siedlecki et al., 2013). 
Similarly, and again consistent with our findings, activity in TPJ and 
dorsomedial PFC was previously found to scale with negative PEs, signalling a 
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violation of social norms which requires participants to take the perspective of 
their interacting partner (Behrens et al. 2008). Finally, the insula has been 
proposed to encode PEs in multiple domains, including social cognition (Singer 
et al. 2009). 
Although several of the advice PE (ε) activations reported in this paper 
have previously been associated with theory of mind processes (Carrington and 
Bailey, 2009; Chang et al., 2011; Decety and Lamm, 2006; Frith and Frith, 2012; 
Lamm et al., 2009), these activations may not be specific to social learning 
tasks. For example, the insula, TPJ, and dorsolateral PFC have also been shown 
to activate during probabilistic reinforcement learning tasks when the reward 
value of available response options changed (Cools et al., 2002; Mitchell et al., 
2008; Remijnse et al., 2005). Furthermore, a network consisting of the bilateral 
dorsolateral frontal cortex, anterior insula, and caudate - a subset of the regions 
showing  effects - has been repeatedly identified in response to unexpected or 
cognitively demanding processes in a wide range of studies (Boorman et al., 
2016; Crittenden et al., 2016; O’Reilly et al., 2013; Schwartenbeck et al., 2016). 
Furthermore, it is important to note that distinct sections of the TPJ 
were differentially recruited in response to predictions and PEs. Effects of 
(inferred) adviser fidelity were localized to the right posterior TPJ with peak 
activation at [48, -58, 21] (Decety and Lamm, 2006; Mars et al., 2011). This 
region of the TPJ has previously shown to be recruited by mentalizing functions 
(Behrens et al., 2008; Boorman et al., 2013; Hampton et al., 2008; Morishima et 
al., 2012; Suzuki et al., 2015).  
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On the other hand, the low-level advice PE or ε	was localised to the 
more anterior region of the TPJ, with an activation peak at [57, -42, 31]. This 
region was shown to be functionally coupled with an “attentional reorienting” 
network, that included the anterior insula and ventrolateral PFC (Corbetta et 
al., 2008; Mars et al., 2012), suggesting that ε may possibly also contribute to 
shifts in attention, beyond its role in belief-updating processes in social 
learning. 
In contrast, high-level PEs (for updating estimates of the (log-)volatility 
of the adviser’s intentions) showed context-specificity in our social learning 
paradigm, engaging regions with known “theory of mind” functions (see Frith 
and Frith, 2005, 2006 for reviews). We found that these high-level PEs  were 
not only reflected by activity in the cholinergic septum (Mesulam, 1995; 
Zaborszky et al., 1999), but were also represented in the dorsal middle cingulate 
cortex peaking at [7, -12, 42] in the first study and in the dorsal ACC with a 
group-level peak at [6, 30, 28] in the second study. The dorsal middle cingulate 
cortex has previously been linked to volatility (Behrens et al., 2007) and 
intentionality processing (see Apps et al., 2013 for a review), respectively. 
Dopamine and acetylcholine in social learning 
In humans, strong empirical evidence points to the involvement of DA in 
signaling reward PEs (D’Ardenne et al., 2008; Klein-Flügge et al., 2011; 
Montague et al., 2004; O’Doherty et al., 2003; Schaaf et al., 2014; Schultz, 1997) 
and novelty (Bunzeck and Düzel, 2006). While there are far fewer empirical 
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studies on DA in a social context, several animal and human behavioural and 
neuroimaging studies suggest that DA may play a pivotal role for social 
learning and inference, too (e.g., Behrens et al. 2008, 2009; Berton et al. 2006; 
Campbell-Meiklejohn et al. 2012; Klucharev et al. 2009). The present study 
contributes a concrete facet of DA’s role for social learning, showing that a 
precision-weighted social PE activated both the dopaminergic midbrain and 
dopaminoceptive “theory of mind” regions in cortex. Importantly, this 
precision-weighted low-level PE was neither related to reward nor novelty; 
instead, it determined belief updates about advice validity, signalling the need 
for perspective-taking in adapting to a potentially changing adviser. 
The same PE showed an interesting dependency on genotype, 
specifically, on allelic variants of the COMT gene, which encodes an enzyme (of 
the same name) with an important role for DA metabolism. In general, the 
enzyme COMT modulates tonic DA levels in the striatum and the PFC (Mier et 
al., 2010) and, in turn, affects different types of learning (Frank et al., 2007). The 
Val allele is associated with greater enzymatic efficacy and lower DA levels than 
the methionine-encoding Met allele. In the present work, in contrast to Val/Val 
and Val/Met carriers, Met/Met individuals (with reduced COMT efficacy and 
hence higher DA levels) showed an enhanced effect of low-level PEs in the 
ventral striatum in both fMRI experiments. (The first experiment also found a 
COMT effect in left dorsolateral PFC, however, this result was not replicated in 
the second experiment). While COMT is usually considered to be particularly 
important for prefrontal DA metabolism, it is worth pointing out in this 
context that the ventral striatum also expresses COMT mRNA (Matsumoto et 
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al., 2003, Chen et al. 2004) and several previous human neuroimaging studies 
have indicated COMT-related effects on activity in the ventral striatum (e.g. 
Camara et al., 2010; Forbes et al., 2009; Yacubian et al., 2007).  
In contrast to DA, the role of ACh for social cognition has arguably 
received considerably less attention. Having said this, the cholinergic septum 
has previously been associated with social learning, for example, Biele and 
colleagues (2011) showed that the septum was particularly sensitive to positive 
outcomes following advice-taking. Furthermore, an interesting although 
presently speculative link may exist between our results and those by Biele et 
al. (2011) and the neuroanatomy of septal-hypothalamic interactions. That is, 
given the nature of the septum-activating high-level PE (which updates beliefs 
about trustworthiness) in our paradigm, it is interesting to note that reciprocal 
projections between septum and hypothalamus exist which are involved in 
regulating oxytocin release (DeFrance, 1976; Landgraf and Neumann, 2004). 
Oxytocin, in turn, has previously been shown to potentiate social exchange by 
increasing trust (Kosfeld et al., 2005), reducing social stress (Heinrichs et al., 
2003) and increasing theory of mind processes (Domes et al., 2007). 
Strengths and limitations of this study 
The most obvious limitation of our present study is that the use of fMRI does 
not permit concluding with certainty that our PE activations of midbrain and 
basal forebrain truly reflect the activity of dopaminergic and cholinergic 
neurons, respectively (see also the discussion in Iglesias et al 2013). These 
regions also contain glutamatergic and GABAergic neurons, and future 
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pharmacological and other interventional studies will need to establish a firm 
link between our computational markers and neuromodulatory transmitters.  
In addition, our study has one notable feature, which can be seen as a 
limitation or a strength. That is, our experimental design did not emphasize the 
recursive nature of social inference, which is an important component of theory 
of mind (see Devaine et al., 2014a, 2014b). This is because the advice in our 
paradigm was provided by video, based on real but pre-recorded adviser-player 
interactions (Diaconescu et al., 2014). This may limit social cognition during 
our paradigm to level 1 theory of mind inference (inferring the mental state of 
the adviser), since higher levels (“I think what he thinks what I think…”) are not 
only not needed, but will be implausible to the player. From one perspective, 
this is a disadvantage because it restricts the conclusions drawn from this study 
to a particular level of social inference and does not cover the full spectrum of 
theory of mind. On the other hand, it can be seen as an advantage because it 
removes uncertainty about individual differences in the level of reasoning and 
allows for straightforward application of efficient models like the HGF which 
do not capture the recursive nature of social interactions (compare the 
discussion in Diaconescu et al. 2014). Additionally, the task design ensures that 
participants engage in the same learning process, because the players’ strategy 
is not dependent on variations in the advisers’ deceptive skills. Finally, the 
recursive depth of social inference during interactive games such as investor-
trustee is typically limited to level 1 or level 2 depth-of-reasoning, suggesting 
that participants simulate their partner’s intentions without simultaneously 
inferring their partner’s model of them (Xiang et al., 2012; Yoshida et al., 2008). 
Hierarchical PEs in Social Learning 
In this paper, we report results that could be replicated across two 
separate fMRI experiments in different groups of volunteers. These two fMRI 
experiments differed in three ways: first, the volatility of the input structure 
was different across the two studies (see Methods section); second, unlike the 
first study, in the second study, participants were administered placebo, 
thereby placing them in a potentially different experimental setting; third, the 
signal-to-noise ratio in subcortical medial regions relative to the rest of the 
cortex may have differed because an 8-channel compared to a 32-channel head 
coil were used in the first and the second fMRI study, respectively. In spite of 
these differences, the reproducibility of the findings is remarkable:  The 
segregated effects of low- and high-level PEs in dopaminergic and cholinergic 
systems respectively were reproduced in both fMRI studies.  
Across the two studies, we also found some differences in the 
representation of the high-level PE. In the first study, ε elicited increased 
activity in the left dorsal middle cingulate cortex (whole-brain, cluster-level 
FWE corrected p<0.05; Figure 6a; Table 4) whereas in the second study, ε 
activated the right ACC and the dorsomedial PFC (whole-brain, cluster-level 
FWE corrected p<0.05; Figure 6b; Table 4). These differences might be due to 
the distinct input structure and increased volatility schedule utilized in the 
second study compared to the first (see Supplementary Figure 1c).  
Conclusions and outlook 
In conclusion, this study employed a multimodal framework that integrates 
computational modelling, fMRI, and genetic analyses to identify key 
Hierarchical PEs in Social Learning 
mechanisms of social inference that generalized across two separate fMRI 
studies, despite differences in task structure and fMRI data acquisition 
methods. 
Our study makes four important contributions to current 
conceptualizations of the neural mechanisms of social learning. First, and most 
generally, it extends empirical support for the relevance of precision-weighted 
PEs – as postulated by previous Bayesian theories of brain function (Friston, 
2005) – to social cognition. Second, it emphasizes a specific role of DA in the 
encoding of low-level PEs about social value, such as advice validity. Third, it 
suggests a specific role for ACh in social cognition that concerns the encoding 
of more abstract, high-level PEs, such as adviser trustworthiness. Fourth, we 
find activations of dopaminergic and cholinergic nuclei by hierarchically 
related PEs that are remarkably analogous to previous results obtained with a 
purely sensory learning task (Iglesias et al., 2013). This suggests that precision-
weighted PEs may constitute generic computational quantities, which are used 
in similar ways across learning domains. At the same time, the differences of 
the cortical activations reported in this study and by Iglesias et al (2013) suggest 
that these PEs are utilized in a context-and circuit-specific way, e.g. as 
plasticity-inducing “teaching signals” which are broadcast via dopaminergic 
and cholinergic projections specifically to those cortical regions which are 
involved in the respective learning context.   
 The examination of the computational quantities critical for social 
learning in healthy volunteers provides a model-based characterization that 
Hierarchical PEs in Social Learning 
may serve as a benchmark for future studies on mechanisms of maladaptive 
“theory of mind” functions. Aspects of this hierarchical learning and weighting 
of social and non-social sources of information during decision-making may be 
differentially impaired in psychiatric disorders such as schizophrenia, 
borderline personality disorder or autism spectrum disorder (Corcoran et al., 
1995; King-Casas et al., 2008; Yoshida et al., 2010). For example, differential 
impairment in DA- versus ACh-dependent processes may contribute to 
explaining individual variability in symptoms as well as treatment responses 
(Stephan et al., 2006).  Once the relevance of our putative DA/ACh markers for 
social inference has been causally established using pharmacological studies in 
healthy volunteers, we intend to extend this computational framework to 
studies of patients exhibiting salient deficiencies in social learning, including 
schizophrenia and autism.  
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Figures Legends 
 
 Figure 1 | Binary Lottery Game:  
 
Eighty-two healthy male volunteers predicted one of 2 winning colors in a 
standard probabilistic reinforcement learning task and aimed to increase their 
score to maximize monetary reward. They were provided with information 
about the outcome probability (which changed in time) by a pie chart with a 
probability structure corresponding to a binary outcome. All the trials 
contained one of 6 visual cue types (75:25, 65:35, 55:45, 45:55, 35:65, and 25:75 
blue: green pie charts) and the outcome (blue or green) was randomly drawn 
from the corresponding distributions. For every prediction they made, they also 
were given advice on which option to choose via pre-recorded videos. Critically, 
the pay-out for the adviser was structured such that his motivation to provide 
valid or misleading information varied across the game. The player therefore 
had to learn about the time-varying intentions of the adviser in order to decide 
whether to trust him or not. 
 
Figure 2| Hierarchical structure of the model space: perceptual models, 
response models, specific models:  
 
The models considered in this study have a 3 x 2 x 2 factorial structure and can 
be displayed as a tree. The leaves at the bottom represent individual models of 
social learning in which both social and non-social sources of information are 
considered. The nodes at the fourth level represent the perceptual model 
families (three-level HGF, reduced two-level HGF, and RW). Two response 
models were formalized under the HGF model: decision noise in the mapping 
of beliefs to decisions either (1) depended dynamically on the estimated 
volatility of the adviser’s intentions (“Volatility” model) or (2) was a fixed entity 
over trials (“Decision noise” model). At the second level, the response model 
parameters can be divided further according to the weighing of social and non-
social information – these models propose that participants’ beliefs are based 
on (1) both cue and advice information and (2) advice only.  The branch on the 
left-hand side proposes a model in which only the given cue probabilities (i.e., 
the pie chart) enter the response model (Cue Probability). [reprinted from 
Diaconescu et al., 2014] 
 
Figure 3| Graphical representation of the HGF and the response model:  
 
In this graphical notation, circles represent constants and diamonds represent 
quantities that change in time (i.e., that carry a time/trial index). Hexagons, 
like diamonds, represent quantities which change in time, but additionally 
depend on the previous state in time in a Markovian fashion. x1 represents the 
accuracy of the current piece of advice, x2 the adviser’s fidelity or tendency to 
give helpful advice and x3 the current volatility of the adviser’s intentions. 
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Parameter κ determines how strongly  x2  and  x3  are coupled, ω determines the 
tonic volatility component, and ϑ represents the volatility of x3. The response 
model has 2 layers: (1) the computation of the integrated belief or 
p(outcome|advice, cued probability), i.e., the probability of the outcome given 
both the non-social cue and the advice; (2) the chosen action, drawn from the 
integrated belief using a sigmoid decision rule. Parameter ζ determines the 
weight of the advice compared to the non-social cue. y represents the subject’s 
binary response (y=1: deciding to accept the advice, y=0: going against the 
advice). 
 
Figure 4| Whole-brain activation by TU	 
Activations by signed precision-weighted prediction error about the adviser 
fidelity in the first fMRI study (A) and the second fMRI study (B). Both 
activation maps are shown at a threshold of p<0.05, FWE corrected for multiple 
comparisons across the whole brain. To highlight replication across studies, 
panel C shows the results of a “logical AND” conjunction, illustrating voxels 
that were significantly activated in both studies.  
 
 
Figure 5| Activation by TU	(midbrain)  
Activation of the dopaminergic VTA/SN associated with the signed precision-
weighted prediction error about the adviser fidelity. This activation is shown at 
p<0.05 FWE corrected for the volume of our anatomical mask comprising both 
dopaminergic and cholinergic nuclei (yellow). A: results from the first fMRI 
study. B: second fMRI study. C: the results of a “logical AND” conjunction, 
illustrating voxels that were significantly activated in both studies. 
 
Figure 6| Whole-brain activation by TV 
Activations by signed precision-weighted PE about the adviser’s strategy in the 
first (A) and the second fMRI study (B). Both activation maps are shown at a 
cluster-level threshold of p<0.05 (k=100), FWE corrected for multiple 
comparisons across the whole brain. To highlight replication across studies, 
panel C shows the results of a “logical AND” conjunction, illustrating voxels 
that were activated in both studies at p < 0.001 uncorrected. 
 
Figure 7| Activation by TV	(septum)  
Activation of the cholinergic septum associated with the signed precision-
weighted prediction error about the adviser’s strategy. This activation is shown 
at p<0.05 FWE corrected for the volume of our anatomical mask comprising 
both dopaminergic and cholinergic nuclei (yellow). A: results from the first 
fMRI study. B: second fMRI study. C: the results of a “logical AND” conjunction, 
illustrating voxels that were significantly activated in both studies. 
 
Figure 8| Whole-brain activation by TU: Variations as a function of COMT 
Larger effects of signed precision-weighted prediction error about the adviser 
fidelity were enhanced in Met/Met allele carriers compared to Val/Met and 
Val/Val in the ventral striatum with a center of gravity at [x = -12, y = 8, z = -12]. 
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A & B: results from the first fMRI study. A distinct effect by W was also detected 
in the striatum at [x = -8, y = 10, z = -1] in the second fMRI study in C & D. 
 
Figure 9| Whole-brain activation by XYU 
Activations by inferred adviser fidelity or ̂ when deciding to take the advice 
(red) and when deciding to go against the advice (blue) in the first (A) and the 
second fMRI study (B). Both activation maps are shown at a threshold of 
p<0.05, FWE corrected for multiple comparisons across the whole brain. To 
highlight replication across studies, panel C shows the results of a “logical 
AND” conjunction, illustrating voxels that were significantly activated in both 
studies.  
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Tables 
Table 1 
A. Results of Bayesian model selection (fMRI Study 1): Model protected 
exceedance probabilities (xp)  
 
  HGF 
No 
volatility 
HGF 
RW 
Cue & 
Advice 
0.9226 0.012 0.0576
Advice 0.0052 0.0023 0
Cue 0 0 0
 
B. Family-level inference (fMRI Study 1: perceptual model set): Posterior 
model probability or p(r|y) and model exceedance probabilities (xp) 
 HGF with 
Volatility 
No 
Volatility 
HGF 
Rescorla-
Wagner 
p(r|y) 0.548 0.2331 0.2189 
xp 0.9398 0.0364 0.0238 
 
 
C. Family-level inference (fMRI Study 1: family model set): Posterior 
model probability or p(r|y) and model exceedance probabilities (xp)   
 Integrated Reduced: 
Advice 
Reduced: 
Cue 
p(r|y) 0.94 0.0533 0.0067 
xp 1 0 0 
 
D. Average MAP estimates of the learning and decision-making 
parameters of the winning model  
Model Mean SD 
HGF (Z[)   
κ 0.41 0.09 
ω  -1.47 1.13 
ϑ 0.38 0.11 
\ 0.5 0.12 
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Table 2 
A. Results of Bayesian model selection (fMRI Study 2): Model protected 
exceedance probabilities (xp)  
 
  HGF 
No 
volatility 
HGF 
RW 
Cue & 
Advice 
0.9361 0.0001 0.0002
Advice 0.0001 0 0
Cue 0 0 0
 
B. Family-level inference (fMRI Study 2: perceptual model set): Posterior 
model probability or p(r|y) and model exceedance probabilities (xp) 
 HGF with 
Volatility 
No 
Volatility 
HGF 
Rescorla-
Wagner 
p(r|y) 0.8818 0.0299 0.0883 
xp 1 0 0 
 
C. Family-level inference (fMRI Study 1: family model set): Posterior 
model probability or p(r|y) and model exceedance probabilities (xp)   
 Integrated Reduced: 
Advice 
Reduced: 
Cue 
p(r|y) 0.8482 0.15 0.0018 
xp 1 0 0 
 
D. Average MAP estimates of the learning and decision-making 
parameters of the winning model  
 
Model Mean SD 
HGF (Z[)   
κ 0.52 0.05 
ω  -2.22 0.93 
ϑ 0.52 0.04 
\ 0.75 0.09 
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Table 3: Low-Level Precision-weighted PEs about Advice Validity (and 
Adviser Fidelity) 
fMRI study 1: epsilon 2            
ventral tegmental area/substantia nigra R 12 -18 -11 2.91 
anterior cingulate cortex R 4 36 30 4.45 
middle cingulate cortex L -8 26 30 3.48 
anterior cingulate cortex L -2 -22 31 4.29 
insula R 34 18 -2 6.65 
insula L -30 27 0 3.78 
  Hemisphere x y z t score 
superior frontal cortex L -21 38 33 4.53 
dorsolateral PFC L -38 21 -3 4.82 
dorsolateral PFC R 44 15 7 6.1 
            
fMRI study 2: epsilon 2            
ventral tegmental area/substantia nigra R 4 -16 10 5.84 
ventral tegmental area/substantia nigra L -2 -20 16 4.75 
TPJ L -34 -46 42 8.93 
TPJ R 52 -50 30 8.93 
caudate L -8 2 10 5.86 
anterior cingulate cortex R 2 -22 28 5.45 
middle temporal cortex L -44 -32 -8 4.42 
superior temporal cortex L -40 -40 2 3.34 
insula R 32 20 -4 10.31 
insula L -32 18 -4 8.94 
dorsomedial PFC L 0 26 54 7.27 
dorsomedial PFC R 4 16 60 7.88 
dorsolateral PFC R 48 18 4 6.28 
            
conjunction: epsilon 2           
ventral tegmental area/substantia nigra R 9 -15 -9 3.81 
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caudate L -8 4 9 2.74 
anterior cingulate cortex R 8 32 27 4.24 
middle cingulate cortex L -2 -21 31 3.78 
insula R 36 20 -2 6 
insula L -38 18 -5 4.77 
middle frontal cortex R 33 12 49 3.2 
superior frontal cortex R 18 -4 60 3.35 
dorsomedial PFC R 6 29 54 4.2 
dorsolateral PFC R 42 16 6 4.46 
 
Table 4: High-Level Precision-weighted PEs about Adviser Volatility  
 
  Hemisphere x y z t score 
fMRI study 1: epsilon 3           
septum L 5 8 -7 4.11 
dorsal middle cingulate 
cortex 
R 9 -19 48 4.78 
            
fMRI study 2: epsilon 3           
septum L -5 12 -7 3.43 
dorsal anterior cingulate 
cortex 
R 6 30 28 4.58 
            
conjunction: epsilon 3           
septum L -5 12 -7 2.9 
dorsal anterior cingulate 
cortex 
R 6 30 28 2.39 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 1 | Binary Lottery Game: Eighty-two healthy male volunteers predicted one of 2 winning colors in a 
standard probabilistic reinforcement learning task and aimed to increase their score to maximize monetary 
reward. They were provided with information about the outcome probability (which changed in time) by a 
pie chart with a probability structure corresponding to a binary outcome. All the trials contained one of 6 
visual cue types (75:25, 65:35, 55:45, 45:55, 35:65, and 25:75 blue: green pie charts) and the outcome 
(blue or green) was randomly drawn from the corresponding distributions. For every prediction they made, 
they also were given advice on which option to choose via pre-recorded videos. Critically, the pay-out for 
the adviser was structured such that his motivation to provide valid or misleading information varied across 
the game. The player therefore had to learn about the time-varying intentions of the adviser in order to 
decide whether to trust him or not.  
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Figure 2| Hierarchical structure of the model space: perceptual models, response models, specific models: 
The models considered in this study have a 3 x 2 x 2 factorial structure and can be displayed as a tree. The 
leaves at the bottom represent individual models of social learning in which both social and non-social 
sources of information are considered. The nodes at the fourth level represent the perceptual model families 
(three-level HGF, reduced two-level HGF, and RW). Two response models were formalized under the HGF 
model: decision noise in the mapping of beliefs to decisions either (1) depended dynamically on the 
estimated volatility of the adviser’s intentions (“Volatility” model) or (2) was a fixed entity over trials 
(“Decision noise” model). At the second level, the response model parameters can be divided further 
according to the weighing of social and non-social information – these models propose that participants’ 
beliefs are based on (1) both cue and advice information and (2) advice only.  The branch on the left-hand 
side proposes a model in which only the given cue probabilities (i.e., the pie chart) enter the response model 
(Cue Probability). [reprinted from Diaconescu et al., 2014]  
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   Figure 3 | Graphical representation of the HGF and the response model: In this graphical notation, 
circles represent constants and diamonds represent quantities that change in time (i.e., that carry a 
time/trial index). Hexagons, like diamonds, represent quantities which change in time, but additionally 
depend on the previous state in time in a Markovian fashion. x1 represents the accuracy of the current piece 
of advice, x2 the adviser’s fidelity or tendency to give helpful advice and x3 the current volatility of the 
adviser’s intentions. Parameter κ determines how strongly  x2  and  x3  are coupled, ω determines the tonic 
volatility component, and ϑ represents the volatility of x3. The response model has 2 layers: (1) the 
computation of the integrated belief or p(outcome|advice, cued probability), i.e., the probability of the 
outcome given both the non-social cue and the advice; (2) the chosen action, drawn from the integrated 
belief using a sigmoid decision rule. Parameter ζ determines the weight of the advice compared to the non-
social cue. y represents the subject’s binary response (y=1: deciding to accept the advice, y=0: going 
against the advice).  
Methods  
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Figure 4| Whole-brain activation by epsilon2: Activations by signed precision-weighted prediction error about 
the adviser fidelity in the first fMRI study (A) and the second fMRI study (B). Both activation maps are 
shown at a threshold of p<0.05, FWE corrected for multiple comparisons across the whole brain. To 
highlight replication across studies, panel C shows the results of a “logical AND” conjunction, illustrating 
voxels that were significantly activated in both studies.  
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Figure 5| Activation by epsilon2 (midbrain): %"Activation of the dopaminergic VTA/SN associated with the 
signed precision-weighted prediction error about the adviser fidelity. This activation is shown at p<0.05 FWE 
corrected for the volume of our anatomical mask comprising both dopaminergic and cholinergic nuclei 
(yellow). A: results from the first fMRI study. B: second fMRI study. C: the results of a “logical AND” 
conjunction, illustrating voxels that were significantly activated in both studies.  
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Figure 6| Whole-brain activation by epsilon3: Activations by signed precision-weighted PE about the 
adviser’s strategy in the first (A) and the second fMRI study (B). Both activation maps are shown at a 
cluster-level threshold of p<0.05 (k=100), FWE corrected for multiple comparisons across the whole brain. 
To highlight replication across studies, panel C shows the results of a “logical AND” conjunction, illustrating 
voxels that were activated in both studies at p < 0.001 uncorrected.  
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 Figure 7| Activation by epsilon3 (septum): Activation of the cholinergic septum associated with the 
signed precision-weighted prediction error about the adviser’s intentions. This activation is shown at p<0.05 
FWE corrected for the volume of our anatomical mask comprising cholinergic nuclei (yellow). A: results from 
the first fMRI study. B: second fMRI study. C: the results of a “logical AND” conjunction, illustrating voxels 
that were significantly activated in both studies.  
Results  
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Figure 8 | Whole-brain activation by epsilon2: Variations as a function of COMT: Larger effects of signed 
precision-weighted prediction error about the adviser fidelity were enhanced in Met/Met allele carriers 
compared to Val/Met and Val/Val in the ventral striatum with a center of gravity at [x = -12, y = 8, z = -
12]. A & B: results from the first fMRI study. A distinct effect by  was also detected in the striatum at [x = -
8, y = 10, z = -1] in the second fMRI study in C & D.  
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Figure 9 | Whole-brain activation by mu2hat: Activations by inferred adviser fidelity or  when deciding to 
take the advice (red) and when deciding to go against the advice (blue) in the first (A) and the second fMRI 
study (B). Both activation maps are shown at a threshold of p<0.05, FWE corrected for multiple 
comparisons across the whole brain. To highlight replication across studies, panel C shows the results of a 
“logical AND” conjunction, illustrating voxels that were significantly activated in both studies.  
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Supplementary Figure 1| Experimental Paradigm: Roles and Incentive Structure: Two sets of participants 
randomly assigned to adviser (A) and player roles (B) took part in an advice-taking game for monetary 
rewards, in which they had to predict the outcome of a binary lottery. If they reached the silver target, they 
received an extra bonus of CHF 10 (Swiss Francs); if they reached gold, they received an extra CHF 20. 
They benefited from considering the other player’s advice. The adviser, whose recommendations were pre-
recorded and presented via video, received more information about the outcome (constant probability of 
80%), and based on this information, advised the player on which option to choose. Critically, the adviser’s 
motivation to provide valid or misleading information varied during the game as a function of his incentive 
structure: If the participant’s score landed within the adviser’s silver range at the end of the game, the 
adviser received an extra CHF 10; if the score landed in the adviser’s golden range, the adviser earned an 
extra CHF 20. Importantly, before the experiment participants were informed (truthfully) that the adviser 
had his own undisclosed incentives and thus his intentions could change during the game. (C) While the 
input structure was based on the dominant strategy of the advisers, the volatility schedule was optimized 
using simulations in the second fMRI study. The objective function used was minimizing the correlations 
between the hierarchical PEs.  
Supplementary File  
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Supplementary Figure 2| Positive correlations with epsilon2: Activations in response to positive signed 
precision-weighted PE about the adviser fidelity in the first (A) and the second fMRI study (B). Both 
activation maps are shown at a threshold of p<0.05, cluster-level FWE corrected for multiple comparisons 
across the whole brain. To highlight replication across studies, panel C shows the results of a “logical AND” 
conjunction, illustrating voxels that were significantly activated in both studies.  
Supplementary File  
352x195mm (72 x 72 DPI)  
 
 
  
 
 
Supplementary Figure 3 | Negative correlations with epsilon3: Activations in response to decreases in signed 
precision-weighted PE about the adviser’s strategy in the first (A) and the second fMRI study (B). Both 
activation maps are shown at a threshold of p<0.05, cluster-level FWE corrected for multiple comparisons 
across the whole brain. To highlight replication across studies, panel C shows the results of a “logical AND” 
conjunction, illustrating voxels that were significantly activated in both studies.  
Supplementary File  
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 Supplementary Figure 4| Advice PEs and correlations with the COMT SNP: (A) Positive precision-
weighted PEs (on trials when the advice was more helpful than predicted) were associated with increased 
activity in the left dorsolateral PFC (t(34) = 5.10, whole-brain FWE correction at the cluster level, p < 0.05). 
Participants with the Met/Met polymorphism (and reduced efficacy of the COMT enzyme) showed a larger 
representation of positive precision-weighted advice PEs in the left dorsolateral PFC compared to Val/Val 
allele carriers (upper middle panel; t(34) = 5.82, whole-brain FWE correction at the cluster level, p < 0.05). 
(B) Negative precision-weighted PEs (on trials when the advice was more misleading than predicted) were 
associated with increased activity in the bilateral dorsomedial PFC and the superior occipital cortex (whole-
brain FWE correction at the cluster level, p < 0.05). Participants with the Met/Met polymorphism showed 
reduced activity for negative PEs in the dorsomedial PFC and the fusiform face area (FFA) compared to 
carriers of the Val allele (lower middle panel; whole-brain FWE correction at the cluster level, p < 0.05).  
Supplementary File  
529x333mm (72 x 72 DPI)  
 
 
  
 
 
 Supplementary Figure 5| Anatomical masks: (A) The VTA/SN mask created using an anatomical atlas 
based on magnetization transfer weighted structural MR images (see Bunzeck and Düzel, 2006). (B) The 
basal forebrain mask created using the an  atomical toolbox in SPM12 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm).  
Supplementary File  
352x215mm (72 x 72 DPI)  
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Supplementary Figures 
 
Supplementary Figure 1| Experimental Paradigm: Roles and Incentive Structure 
  
Two sets of participants randomly assigned to adviser (A) and player roles (B) took part in 
an advice-taking game for monetary rewards, in which they had to predict the outcome of 
a binary lottery. If they reached the silver target, they received an extra bonus of CHF 10 
(Swiss Francs); if they reached gold, they received an extra CHF 20. They benefited from 
considering the other player’s advice. The adviser, whose recommendations were pre-
recorded and presented via video, received more information about the outcome 
(constant probability of 80%), and based on this information, advised the player on which 
option to choose. Critically, the adviser’s motivation to provide valid or misleading 
information varied during the game as a function of his incentive structure: If the 
participant’s score landed within the adviser’s silver range at the end of the game, the 
adviser received an extra CHF 10; if the score landed in the adviser’s golden range, the 
adviser earned an extra CHF 20. Importantly, before the experiment participants were 
informed (truthfully) that the adviser had his own undisclosed incentives and thus his 
intentions could change during the game. (C) While the input structure was based on the 
dominant strategy of the advisers, the volatility schedule was optimized using simulations 
in the second fMRI study. The objective function used was minimizing the correlations 
between the hierarchical PEs.  
 
 
Supplementary Figure 2| Positive correlations with  
Activations in response to positive signed precision-weighted PE about the adviser fidelity 
in the first (A) and the second fMRI study (B). Both activation maps are shown at a 
threshold of p<0.05, cluster-level FWE corrected for multiple comparisons across the 
whole brain. To highlight replication across studies, panel C shows the results of a “logical 
AND” conjunction, illustrating voxels that were significantly activated in both studies.  
 
Supplementary Figure 3 | Negative correlations with  
Activations in response to decreases in signed precision-weighted PE about the adviser’s 
strategy in the first (A) and the second fMRI study (B). Both activation maps are shown at 
a threshold of p<0.05, cluster-level FWE corrected for multiple comparisons across the 
whole brain. To highlight replication across studies, panel C shows the results of a “logical 
AND” conjunction, illustrating voxels that were significantly activated in both studies.  
 
Supplementary Figure 4| Advice PEs and correlations with the COMT SNP:  
(A) Positive precision-weighted PEs (on trials when the advice was more helpful than 
predicted) were associated with increased activity in the left dorsolateral PFC (t(34) = 
5.10, whole-brain FWE correction at the cluster level, p < 0.05). Participants with the 
Met/Met polymorphism (and reduced efficacy of the COMT enzyme) showed a larger 
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representation of positive precision-weighted advice PEs in the left dorsolateral PFC 
compared to Val/Val allele carriers (upper middle panel; t(34) = 5.82, whole-brain FWE 
correction at the cluster level, p < 0.05). (B) Negative precision-weighted PEs (on trials 
when the advice was more misleading than predicted) were associated with increased 
activity in the bilateral dorsomedial PFC and the superior occipital cortex (whole-brain 
FWE correction at the cluster level, p < 0.05). Participants with the Met/Met 
polymorphism showed reduced activity for negative PEs in the dorsomedial PFC and the 
fusiform face area (FFA) compared to carriers of the Val allele (lower middle panel; 
whole-brain FWE correction at the cluster level, p < 0.05).  
 
Supplementary Figure 5| Anatomical masks:  
(A) The VTA/SN mask created using an anatomical atlas based on magnetization transfer 
weighted structural MR images (see Bunzeck and Düzel, 2006). (B) The basal forebrain 
mask created using the anatomical toolbox in SPM12 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). 
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Tables 
Supplementary Table 1: Prior mean and variance of the perceptual and response 
model parameters [reprinted from Diaconescu et al., 2014] 
Parameter Prior mean Prior variance 
(i) HGF model class 
 
M
1
…M
6
   
κ 0.5 1 
ω   -2 100 
 0.5 1 
 
µ
2
k=0( )
 
0 1 
 
σ
2
k=0( )
 
1 1 
 
µ
3
k=0( )
 
1 1 
 
σ
3
k=0( )
 
1 1 
 
(ii) No Volatility HGF model class
 
M
7
…M
9  
  
κ
 
0.5 0 
ω  
 
-2 100 

 
0.5 0 
 
µ
2
k=0( )
 
0 1 
 
σ
2
k=0( )
 
1 1 
 
µ
3
k=0( )
 
1 0 
 
σ
3
k=0( )
 
1 0 
(iii) Rescorla-Wagner model class
 
M
10
…M
12  
  
α  0.2 1 
 v
k=0( )
 
0.5 1 
(iv) Integrated model class
 
M
1
,M
4
,M
7
,M
10
   
ζ   0 1 
β  48 1 
(v) Reduced: Advice 
 
M
2
,M
5
,M
8
,M
11
   
ζ  ∞ 0 
β  48 1 
(vi) Reduced: Cue model class 
 
M
3
,M
6
,M
9
,M
12
   
ζ  −∞  0 
β  48 1 
Page 4 of 5
Note: The prior variances are given in the space in which parameters are estimated. κ , ϑ , α ,
 
µ
2
k=0( )
,µ
3
k=0( )
,v
k=0( )
 and ζ  are estimated in logit-space, while 
 
σ
2
, 
 
σ
3
 and β are estimated in log-
space.  
 
Supplementary Table 2: Neural Representations of positive, low-level precision-
weighted PEs  
 
  Hemisphere x y z t score 
fMRI study 1:  
positive correlations 
epsilon 2  
          
TPJ L -40 -43 27 3.33 
middle temporal cortex R 40 -54 -3 3.85 
fusiform gyrus L -28 -72 -8 3.46 
            
fMRI study 2:  
positive correlations 
epsilon 2 
          
precuneus L 0 -58 19 5.38 
            
conjunction:  
positive correlations 
epsilon 2 
          
precuneus L 0 -58 19 2.71 
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Supplementary Table 3: Negative correlations with high-level precision-weighted 
PEs 
  Hemisphere x y z t score 
fMRI study 1:  
epsilon 3 
negative correlations  
          
supplementary motor area R 12 -22 48 6.85 
middle cingulate sulcus R 9 -13 40 5.48 
middle cingulate sulcus L -16 -43 37 5.77 
            
fMRI study 2:  
epsilon 3  
negative correlations 
          
middle cingulate sulcus L -8 -36 62 5.21 
paracentral lobule R 8 -24 72 5.19 
            
conjunction:  
epsilon 3 
negative correlations 
          
middle cingulate sulcus R 4 -19 52 4.43 
paracentral lobule R 8 -30 57 3.87 
 
